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Abstract
In the US, black workers spend more time in unemployment, lose their jobs
more rapidly, and earn lower wages than white workers. This paper quan-
tifies the contributions of statistical discrimination, as portrayed by negative
stereotyping and screening discrimination, to such employment and wage dis-
parities. We develop an equilibrium search model of statistical discrimination
with learning based on Moscarini (2005) and estimate it by indirect inference.
We show that statistical discrimination alone cannot simultaneously explain
the observed differences in residual wages and monthly job loss probabilities
between black and white workers. However, a model with negative stereotyp-
ing, larger unemployment valuation and faster learning about the quality of
matches for black workers can account for these facts. One implication of our
findings is that black workers have larger returns to tenure.
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1 Introduction
Compared to white male workers, black male workers earn lower wages, stay
unemployed longer and lose their jobs more rapidly. Though a substantial part
of such disparities can be explained by differences in observable characteristics
such as age, education, marital status or location, residual wages and employment
differentials are large and persist over time (see, e.g., Lang and Lehmann (2012)).
These findings raise questions on the roles played by unobserved skills, i.e., skills
that are undocumented in survey data but have a crucial impact on workers’ per-
formance. How are such skills distributed among blacks and whites? How much
time do employers need to figure out the true productivity of a worker-job pair? Is
this learning process faster for whites than for blacks?
The branch of economics addressing these questions is referred to as statistical
discrimination. This type of discrimination arises when employers imperfectly ob-
serve the productivity of workers, while the distribution of productive outcomes
varies across race. Since Phelps (1972), statistical discrimination takes two forms:
negative stereotyping and screening discrimination. Negative stereotyping (here-
after, NS) happens when employers believe that jobs occupied by black workers
are on average less productive. All blacks are attributed the mean black produc-
tivity, which generates wage redistribution among black employees, from those in
highly productive jobs to those in low productive ones. Screening discrimination
(hereafter, SD) occurs when employers need more time to learn the productivity
of jobs occupied by black workers. These workers are seen as less employable and
experience slower wage growth.
Statistical discrimination has never been evaluated within the context of a for-
mal model predicting racial wage gaps as well as differences in the probability that
an unemployed worker finds a job and the probability that an employed worker be-
comes unemployed. This paper aims to fill this gap. We provide a dynamic model
of statistical discrimination with search frictions and employer-employee learning
and then estimate its structural parameters with indirect inference. Our results
shed light on a fundamental trade-off between fitting wage disparities and fitting
employment ones. This leads us to a different perspective on SD: the learning pro-
cess is likely faster with blacks than with whites, a phenomenon we refer to as
anti-screening discrimination (anti-SD).
We first begin our analysis by presenting several empirical regularities in Sec-
tion 2. Specifically, we use the Current Population Survey and focus on prime-aged
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low-skilled male workers to describe the black-white wage and employment dis-
parities. We compute the job-finding and job-separation rates of blacks and whites
following Shimer (2012). The job-finding and job loss rate differentials are above
30%, i.e., blacks spend 30% more time in unemployment and are 50% more likely
to lose their job in the following month. We then compute residual wages using
a Mincer wage regression. We find the quantile differentials of the residual wage
distributions are large – the wage gap amounts to 14 percents for both entry wages
and unconditional wages – and increasing, i.e., residual wage disparities are larger
in levels at the top than at the bottom of the wage distribution.
We then proceed to our theoretical model, presented in Section 3, which draws
from Moscarini (2005) who introduces job turnover in the spirit of Jovanovic (1984)
in an equilibrium search unemployment framework. Each match between ex-ante
identical workers and firms is characterized by an unobserved match quality that
can be high or low. All worker-firm pairs start with a probability of being in a high-
quality match and the true match quality is gradually learnt over time by observing
output realizations. Job loss occurs when a worker-firm pair learns their match is
sufficiently likely to be of low quality. Wage bargaining over the match surplus
implies there is a mapping from the ergodic distribution of posterior beliefs about
match quality to the stationary wage distribution.
In our model we introduce two groups of workers, blacks and whites, and
group-specific distributions of observed and unobserved skills. To account for hir-
ing discrimination, prior beliefs about the quality of matches are drawn from a
distribution with a continuous support. This distribution is allowed to be different
between blacks and whites to reflect differences in unobserved heterogeneity be-
tween the two groups. As a consequence, the model predicts job-finding, job loss
and the wage distribution for both groups of workers.
In Section 4, we use the simulated method of moments to estimate our model.
We target moments characterizing labor market outcomes for both groups, mean
monthly job-finding and job loss probabilities, quantiles of the unconditional wage
distribution, and quantiles of the entry wage distribution, to obtain two main re-
sults.
On the one hand, statistical discrimination, as portrayed by NS and SD, fails to
match simultaneously the properties of the quantile differentials and those of the
job-finding and job loss probability differentials. In particular, NS predicts glob-
ally decreasing quantile differentials and small job loss differential, whereas SD
predicts increasing quantile differentials and higher job loss for whites. The in-
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tuition for this result is straigforward and goes beyond the particularities of our
model: when learning about match quality is faster for whites, these workers ben-
efit from higher wage growth (high-quality matches are rapidly revealed), but also
experience shorter job durations (low-quality matches are also rapidly revealed).
On the other hand, we show that together with differences in the valuation of
unemployment between blacks and whites, statistical discrimination can explain all
of the observed empirical regularities. The resulting estimation involves NS, anti-
SD and higher utility when unemployed for blacks. Anti-SD means that output
signals occuring during employment are more accurate when the worker is black.
Following the previous reasoning, blacks lose their jobs faster. Then, NS guaran-
tees that the black-white differential remains large, whereas higher unemployment
valuation for blacks ensures the quantile differentials of the wage distributions are
increasing.
Given the focus of the literature, anti-SD seems counter-intuitive. The screen-
ing discrimination literature mainly emphasizes the opposite.1 One recent paper,
however, offers a micro foundation of anti-SD. Cavounidis and Lang (2015) study
managers’ incentive to monitor the different groups of workers. They show that
when blacks are more often in unproductive jobs, employers have stronger incen-
tive to monitor them.
Furthermore, anti-SD offers a new perspective on racial returns to tenure. Fryer Jr
et al. (2013) estimate blacks have a return-to-tenure rate that is 1.1 percentage points
higher than for whites. They explain this result with a stylized three-period model
of statistical discrimination where productivity is revealed after one period. NS im-
plies that black workers will, on average, receive lower wages than whites, which
leads to larger scope for wage improvement. Our estimate with anti-SD also con-
cludes the return to tenure is larger for blacks than for whites (by 1.7 percentage
points), but for a completely different reason: anti-SD implies learning is faster for
blacks.
There already exist estimates of models of statistical discrimination for the labor
market, but they do not feature search unemployment. Moro (2003) develops and
estimates a model of racial discrimination with complementarities between skilled
and unskilled workers, whereas Gayle and Golan (2012) focus on gender gaps.
Both papers abstract from search frictions and do not account for racial differences
1For example, Ritter and Taylor (2011) have an efficiency wage model rationalizing racial unem-
ployment disparities in which performance observability during employment is better for whites
than for blacks. They relate this assumption to the theory of language discrimination (Lang, 1986).
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in unemployment duration and job separation.
By contrast, there is a substantial literature offering estimates of taste-based dis-
crimination in search unemployment models. These models follow Becker (1971)
and aim to disentangle the respective roles played by racial prejudice and un-
observed worker heterogeneity in the labor market outcomes of different demo-
graphic groups: Black (1995), Eckstein and Wolpin (1999), Bowlus and Eckstein
(2002), Borowczyk-Martins et al. (2014), for racial discrimination, but also Flabbi
(2010a,b) for gender discrimination. Our approach does not aim to disentangle
prejudice from unobserved worker heterogeneity, but we are not necessarily in-
consistent with this literature. Indeed, NS may reflect, in addition to differences
in productivity of the members of a particular group, existence of employers with
discriminatory tastes.
More generally, search and matching models provide an interesting framework
to study discrimination. In the spirit of Arrow (1973), several papers show discrim-
ination can arise in equilibrium despite employers having no taste for discrimina-
tion and blacks and whites having similar characteristics.2 We do not explore the
rich possibilities offered by such models. Instead, we draw from the framework
of Phelps (1972) where skills are exogenously different between blacks and whites,
and output observability varies across ethnic groups.
2 Evidence
In this section we summarize key differences in labor market outcomes of blacks
and whites. Our analysis focuses on job-finding and job loss probabilities, as well
as residual wages. All these facts will be consistent with the model presented in
Section 3 and estimated in Section 4.
Data.—We use Basic Monthly Data of the Current Population Survey (CPS) from
January 2003 to December 2008 and limit the sample to individuals who declare
themselves to be either black or white males. For homogeneity, we only consider
individuals without college education between the ages of 25 and 55 and we focus
2In Rose´n (1997), employers have private information on match-specific productivity. Discrimi-
nated Blacks apply for low-quality matches, thereby creating the type of belief that leads employers
to discriminate them. In Mailath et al. (2000), employers can direct their search towards Blacks or
Whites, whereas workers make a pre-market investment in skills. If employers do not send of-
fers to Blacks, then these workers invest less in human capital, justifying employers’ behavior. In
Holden and Rose´n (2014), match quality is random and workers in bad matches search on the job.
As dismissal is costly, employers trapped in a bad match hope that the worker finds another job
very rapidly. Now, if employers discriminate against Blacks, these workers find alternative jobs less
rapidly, and thus become less attractive to employers.
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on full-time workers in nonagriculture private sectors, and exclude self-employed
workers.
Transition probabilities.—To measure the average monthly job loss probability
and the average monthly job-finding probability, we follow Shimer (2012) and sup-
pose that all workers of a given group have the same job-finding and job separa-
tion rates and ignore movements in and out of the labor force. The method uses
monthly measures of the number of employed and unemployed workers as well
as the number of unemployed workers with zero to four weeks duration of each
group. The details are explained in Appendix A.
Figure 1: The ins and outs of unemployment
(a) Job-finding probability
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Notes.— Prime-age men with no college, 2003m1-2014m12, 12 month moving average of monthly data. Source: Current
Population Survey and authors’ calculations.
Figure 1 shows the monthly job-finding and employment exit probabilities over
an enlarged period that also includes the Great Recession. Several facts about
racial differences in labor market transition probabilities stand out. First, a typical
black unemployed worker is on average 30% less likely to find a job in a given
month over the observed period. The racial gap in the job-finding probability is
relatively stable over the businness cycle. Second, black workers are 50% more
likely to become unemployed in a given month than white workers. The racial gap
in separation rates appears to be less stable over time, however, it is mainly due to
the less precise estimates of the separation rate of black workers. Finally, as can be
observed in Figure 1, the transition rates are relatively stable during the pre-crisis
period that we use for our estimation.
Residual wages.—To construct residual wages, we account for characteristics that
are not modelled by our theory. We thus omit black workers and workers with
tenure because their effects will be precisely modelled in the next section. To obtain
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the returns to explanatory variables other than race and tenure, we estimate a
reduced-form wage regression on a subset of newly hired white workers:
ln wj = AjΓ+ ej, (1)
where wj is the real hourly wage of a newly hired white individual j and ej is the
residual. Aj is a vector of individual characteristics that includes a constant term,
years of schooling, age, age squared, marital status, state, occupation and industry
dummies. Considering age and age squared allows us to account for the effects of
experience and general human capital accumulation that our model neglects. The
underlying assumption is that workers accumulate general human capital whether
they are employed or not.
We use the estimated returns to characteristics, Γˆ, to obtain residual wages of
all workers in our sample including blacks and those with postive tenure within
the firm. For individual i, we define the efficient wage as follows
ωi =
wi exp(−AiΓˆ)
maxj{wj exp(−AjΓˆ)}
, (2)
where wi is the observed hourly wage, Γˆ is the vector of OLS estimates of equation
(1). The normalization implies that the maximum efficient wage is equal to one.
This procedure leaves us with two residual wage distributions, one for each group.
To implement this procedure we use the Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups
when information on usual weekly hours/earnings is recorded. Specifically, this
information is measured at the household’s fourth and eighth month in the sur-
vey. To obtain hourly wages we use reported usual hourly wages when a worker
is paid hourly, or usual weekly earnings divided by usual weekly hours worked
otherwise. Since wages are top-coded, we only consider observations with hourly
wages above $1 and below $100 when estimating returns to observable character-
istics and we trim the top and bottom 2% of the residual hourly wage distribution
for both groups. The resulting sample contains roughly 118,000 individual-year
observations, of which nearly 9% correspond to blacks. We define newly hired
workers as those employed during the fourth or the eighth month in the survey
and nonemployed at any point previously.
Table 1 provides the main moments of efficient wage distributions of both
groups. Again, several facts stand out. First, the median black-white wage gap
is around 14 percent for both the unconditional and the entry wage distributions.
Second, as can be seen in column Diff., quantile differentials of both distributions
6
Table 1: Summary statistics of efficient wages
All jobs New jobs
Whites Blacks Diff. Log-Diff. Whites Blacks Diff. Log-Diff.
Mean .444 .394 .051 .121 .411 .365 .045 .117
St.-dev. .161 .148 .013 .086 .155 .144 .011 .072
Min .181 .161 .019 .113 .181 .169 .012 .070
5th perc. .232 .204 .027 .126 .218 .199 .019 .091
25th perc. .323 .286 .037 .122 .296 .261 .035 .126
50th perc. .415 .361 .054 .139 .377 .328 .049 .139
75th perc. .536 .473 .064 .126 .492 .439 .053 .115
95th perc. .761 .701 .060 .082 .727 .677 .051 .072
Max 1.000 .911 .089 .093 .999 .890 .109 .115
N 107,223 10,698 5,146 633
Notes.—Efficient wages are defined in (2). The first four columns correspond to the unconditional efficient wage distribution,
the last four ones to the entry wage distribution. The third and fourth columns for both distributions, Diff. and Log-Diff.,
report the black-white difference and log-difference, respectively.
are strongly increasing. Having increasing quantile differentials means that wage
disparities are larger in levels at the right of the distribution than at its left. Third,
uncoditional distribution of wages stochastically dominates the entry wage distri-
bution and the difference is substantial. At the median, wages in all jobs are around
10 percent lower than in new jobs for both groups of workers.
The facts we describe here are in line with the literature. Elsby et al. (2010)
find quantitatively similar aggregate racial differences in unemployment inflow
and outflow rates using the CPS data, whereas DellaVigna and Paserman (2005)
document the job-finding rate from unemployment is about 20% lower for blacks
than for whites using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Wage gaps are
slightly higher than usual: Lang and Lehmann (2012) summarize the evidence by
stating the unexplained wage gap is in the order of 10 percentage points. However,
by design our measure of residual wage dispersion does not correct for differential
tenures and returns to tenure between the two groups.
To summarize, blacks find jobs less rapidly, their jobs last shorter and differ-
ential quantiles are increasing. The rest of the paper is devoted to explaining
these facts. Section 3 presents a dynamic model of statistical discrimination with
employer-employee learning and search frictions, whereas Section 4 describes its
estimation.
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3 Theory
Our model draws from Moscarini (2005) who introduces job turnover in the
spirit of Jovanovic (1984) in a Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) equilibrium search
unemployment framework. To this, we add two groups of workers with different
productive abilities, different prior beliefs on the quality of matches, and different
output observability. We first present the model and then focus on mechanisms
and outcomes of discrimination.
All proofs lie in the Appendix D.
3.1 Model
Assumptions.—The labor market is populated by a continuum of risk-neutral
workers of measure one and a continuum of firms that post vacancies. The labor
market is characterized by random search frictions. Firms are identical, whereas
workers differ in observable type α and demographic group i = B, W, where B
stands for black and W for white. The measure of each group is mi, such that mB +
mW = 1, and the distribution of type is group-specific: the cumulative distribution
function (cdf) is Ψi and the associated probability density function (pdf) is ψi ≡ Ψ′i.
The endogenous measure of unemployed workers in group i is ui. When un-
employed workers of type α obtain utility flow biα and receive job offers at rate
λ, irrespective of their type. Then the firm and the worker decide if they form a
match. Employed workers lose their job at exogenous rate δ and also when the
match surplus falls below zero. Though Moscarini (2005) extends his model to on-
the-job search, we do not allow for it. The idea of our paper is to isolate learning
as the only factor of wage growth and see how far statitical discrimination can go
to explain employment and wage disparities between blacks and whites. Therefore
we do not consider alternative mechanisms on the premise that they are similar for
blacks and whites.3
The output of a firm-worker pair depends on workers’ type and match quality
µ according to yαµ = αµ. Match quality can take two values: the match is good
when µ = µH and bad when µ = µL < µH. Match quality is imperfectly observed
at hiring and gradually learnt with tenure. When a firm and a worker meet, they
draw a common signal p0 ∈ [0, 1] about the average productivity of the match. The
3The computation of efficient wages provides a good illustration of this idea. Entry wages are
regressed on age and age squared to capture the effects of labor pmarket experience. Such effects, by
assumption, are the same for blacks and whites. On the-job-search and human capital accumulation
are discussed in Section 4.4, which examines the robustness of our results.
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signal is such that p0 = Pr(µ = µH) = 1− Pr(µ = µL). In Moscarini (2005), this
signal takes a single value. To account for hiring discrimination and for a non-
degenerate wage distribution of those newly hired, we assume the signal is drawn
from the group-specific cdf G0i with associated pdf g
0
i ≡ G0′i .
Match productivity is subject to an additional source of idiosyncratic noise. The
cumulative output of a match of tenure t follows a Brownian motion with drift αµ
and type-specific variance α2σ2Xi:
Xαit = α (µt + σXiZt) ∼ N (αµt, α2σ2Xit), (3)
where Zt is a Wiener process that keeps µ hidden. Given log-linearity in α, the
variance-to-output ratio is type-independent.
After observing flow match output, dXαit, firms and workers update their belief
with regard to match quality using Bayes’ rule. Let pαit be the probability that the
match is good. Wonham (1964) shows that pαit follows a diffusion process:
dpαit = σpi(pαit)dZαit, (4)
where
σpi(p) = p(1− p)µH − µLσXi (5)
is the diffusion parameter and
dZαit =
dXαit − pαitαµHdt− (1− pαit)αµLdt
ασXi
(6)
is the innovation process, i.e., the normalized difference between realized and un-
conditionally expected flow output. The variable Zαit follows a standard Wiener
process. Note that dXαit is log-linear in worker type α and so equations (4)-(6)
imply that beliefs depend on worker group and job tenure, but not on worker type.
Value functions.—Let wαi(p) be the wage and Wαi(p) be the value of holding a
job when the belief on match quality is p. Also let Uαi denote the worker’s value
of unemployment and Jαi(p) be the value of a firm employing this worker.
The workers’ values solve the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations:
rUαi = biα+ λ
∫
max {Wαi(p)−Uαi, 0} dG0i (p), (7)
rWαi(p) = wαi(p) +
1
2
σ2pi(p)W
′′
αi(p) + δ[Uαi −Wαi(p)], (8)
The value of opening a vacancy is arbitrarily set to zero. In Appendix B, we close
the model and introduce a standard constant returns to scale matching function
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and costly entry for firms. The value of a filled job with belief p solves the following
HJB equation:
rJαi(p) = αµ(p)− wαi(p) + 12σ
2
pi(p)J
′′
αi(p)− δJαi(p), (9)
where µ(p) ≡ pµH + (1− p)µL is the expected flow output.
Equilibrium wages and reservation values.—Conditional on belief p, the equilib-
rium wage is pinned down by a generalized Nash bargaining solution so that
Wαi(p)−Uαi = βSαi(p), (10)
where β ∈ [0, 1] is the worker’ bargaining power and Sαi(p) ≡Wαi(p)−Uαi + Jαi(p)
is the total match surplus.
Match formation and dissolution obey the same optimal stopping strategy. To
ensure the threshold belief p
αi
is nontrivial, we assume the following parametric
restrictions hold:
µH > b > µL − βλµH − µLr + δ
∫ 1
0
pdG0i (p). (11)
The first inequality states that flow output in a good match must be larger than the
utility flow derived from unemployment. If not, the match surplus is negative. The
second inequality states that the utility flow derived from unemployment must be
sufficiently large. Otherwise, all meetings give birth to employment relationships
and hiring discrimination does not take place.
Using (8) and (9), we can rewrite the total surplus as the following second-order
differential equation:
Sαi(p) =
αµ(p) + 12σ
2
pi(p)S
′′
αi(p)− rUαi
r + δ
, (12)
subject to value matching, Sαi(pαi) = 0, and smooth pasting, S
′
αi(pαi) = 0. Following
Moscarini (2005) , we solve this differential equation and obtain:
Sαi(p) = cαi p
1
2−
√
1
4+2
r+δ
s2i (1− p)
1
2+
√
1
4+2
r+δ
s2i +
αµ(p)− rUαi
r + δ
(13)
where si ≡ (µH − µL)/σXi is the signal-to-noise ratio. The coefficient cαi and the
optimal stopping belief p
αi
solve the system of value matching and smooth pasting
equations. Existence and uniqueness of the solution is given in Appendix C. The
resulting match surplus increases with belief p ∈ [p
αi
, 1].
Nash bargaining implies βJ′′αi(p) = (1− β)W ′′αi(p). Using this fact yields a sim-
ple expression for the equilibrium wage:
wαi(p) = βαµ(p) + (1− β)rUαi, (14)
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which is linearly increasing in belief p.
We plug the match surplus solution (13) into the value of unemployment (7),
use the Nash bargaining solution (10) and obtain the return to search:
rUαi =
bα+ βλ
∫
p≥p
αi
(r + δ)cαi p 12−
√
1
4+2
r+δ
s2i (1− p)
1
2+
√
1
4+2
r+δ
s2i + αµ(p)
 dG0i (p)
r + δ+ βλ(1− G0i (pαi))
.
(15)
Lemma (Worker type heterogeneity) The following statements hold for all p ∈ [0, 1]
and all i = B, W:
(i) the functions Uαi, Wαi, Jαi and wαi are proportional to α, i.e., Uαi = αUi,
Wαi(p) = αWi(p), Jαi(p) = αJi(p), wαi(p) = αwi(p);
(ii) the belief threshold p
αi
does not depend on worker type, i.e., p
αi
= p
i
.
Worker type heterogeneity has simple effects on model outcomes. In particular,
wages are log-linear in α and the optimal stopping belief does not depend on α.
These properties justify our procedure to cosntruct residual wages. Wage log-
linearity implies we can isolate efficient wages by mean of a Mincer regression on
newly hired whites, whereas the independence of the threshold belief vis-a`-vis α
guarantess the job-finding and job loss rates do not vary within groups.
Ergodic belief distribution.—Let gi(p) be the unnormalized pdf of the ergodic
belief distribution among workers of group i. For beliefs below the threshold p
i
,
this density is gi(p) = 0. For beliefs above the threshold, the Kolmogorov forward
equation describes its motion. Imposing stationarity we obtain:
0 = ∂tgi(p) = ∂pp
(
1
2
σ2pi(p)gi(p)
)
+ λuig0i (p)− δgi(p), (16)
where ui is the measure of unemployed workers. The first term balances all flows
due to learning. The second term is the flow of workers at p from unemployment.
The last term captures the attrition due to exogenous separation.
The forward equation is subject to two boundary conditions. The first condition
states that the mass of workers above p
i
is equal to the mass of employees, i.e.,∫
gi(p)dp = mi − ui ∈ [0, mi]. Moscarini (2005) names the second condition no
time spending at p
i
(NTS): 12σ
2
pi(pi)gi(pi) = 0. As σ
2
pi(pi) 6= 0 for pi > 0, the NTS
condition implies that gi(pi) = 0. Therefore the density of the belief distribution
must be zero at its lower bound.
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Hereafter, we suppose there exist A < ∞ and a > −1 such that limp→1 g0i (p)(1−
p)1/2−(1/4+2δ/s2i )1/2/[A(1− p)a] < 1, i.e., the density function g0i is sufficiently small
in the neighborhood of p = 1.
Proposition 1 (Ergodic belief distribution). Let νi = (1/4+ 2δ/s2i )
1/2, i = B, W.
For all p ≥ p
i
,
gi(p) = λui[p(1− p)]−3/2−νi /(νis2i )×{
p2νi
∫ 1
p
g0i (x)x
1/2−νi(1− x)1/2+νi dx
+(1− p)2νi
(
ki −
∫ 1
p
g0i (x)x
1/2+νi(1− x)1/2−νi dx
)}
, (17)
with
ki =
∫ 1
p
i
g0i (x)x
1/2+νi(1− x)1/2−νi dx−
(
p
i
1− p
i
)2νi ∫ 1
p
i
g0i (x)x
1/2−νi(1− x)1/2+νi dx.
(18)
This (unnormalized) pdf generalizes Moscarini (2005) to the case of any non-
degenerate prior distribution. As in Moscarini, the density is such that gi(pi) = 0
and gi(1) = 0 when δ > s2i . Otherwise, limp→1 gi(p) = ∞. Thus the exogenous
component of job destruction must be sufficiently large to avoid cases with a large
concentration of workers around the highest possible beliefs. Lastly, gi(pi) = 0 and
g(1) = 0 does not imply single-peakedness, which depends on properties of the
prior distribution.
Given gi, the corresponding normalized pdf is obtained by dividing by the
mass of workers in employment. Namely, let g˜i be the normalized pdf of the
ergodic belief distribution and G˜i be the corresponding cdf. We have g˜i(p) =
gi(p)/
∫
gi(a)da and G˜i(p) =
∫
a≤p g˜i(a)da.
Stationary wage distribution.—As explained above, wages are linear functions of
beliefs, i.e. wαi(p) = βαµ(p) + (1− β)rUαi. We define ωi = wαi/α as the efficient
wage and ∆ω(p) ≡ ωW(p)− ωB(p) as the black-white efficient wage differential con-
ditional on belief p. The efficient wage differential measures wage discrimination
because it focuses on two seemingly identical workers who hold a job characterized
by the same belief on match quality.
We also define Fi as the group-i-specific efficient wage distribution. By defini-
tion, Fi(ω) = Pr[ωi ≤ ω | i]. We compute the different quantiles of the distribution
as follows: for q ∈ [0, 1], ωiq = F−1i (q) is the q-th quantile of the group-i-specific
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wage distribution. Lastly, z(q) ≡ ωWq −ωBq is the black-white quantile differential, or
quantile differential for short.
The quantiles of the wage distribution are such that ωiq = β(µH − µL)G˜−1i (q) +
(1− β)rUi + βµL. Therefore the quantile differential is
z(q) = β(µH − µL)
[
G˜−1W (q)− G˜−1B (q)
]
+ (1− β)r (UW −UB) . (19)
The first term is the difference in belief quantile. This term depends on the thresh-
old beliefs of the two groups, the group-specific variances of output noise, the rates
at which worker-firm pairs learn match quality, and the job separation rates. It is
positive when the ergodic belief distribution of whites stochastically dominates at
first order the distribution of blacks. The second term depends on the differential
return to search. It is positive when whites fare better than blacks in the labor
market.
By construction, z(1) = (1− β)r (UW −UB) and z(0) = β(µH − µL)(pW − pB) +
(1− β)r (UW −UB). The top quantile differential mirrors the outside option differ-
ential. The bottom quantile differential also reflects differential selection through
the differential belief threshold.
3.2 Discrimination
We now turn to potential differences between blacks and whites conditional
on type α. Hereafter, we refer to efficient wages as being simply wages. We con-
sider the two aspects of statistical discrimination, i.e., negative stereotyping (NS)
and screening discrimination (SD). We also study unemployment valuation (UV)
heterogeneity because this factor is important in the next section. In this presenta-
tion, blacks are supposedly exposed to discrimination and higher unemployment
valuation.
Negative stereotyping.—In this case, employers hold negative (rational) beliefs
about the ability of black workers to form a good match.
Assumption 1 (Stochastic dominance): The distribution G0W(p) stochastically dom-
inates the distribution G0B(p) at first order, i.e., G
0
B(p) ≥ G0W(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1] and
there is p˜ ∈ [p
W
, 1] such that G0B( p˜) > G
0
W( p˜). Moreover, σXB = σXW = σX and
bB = bW = b.
Stochastic dominance is a simple way to describe prior heterogeneity between
groups. Black workers tend to draw lower initial beliefs on match quality. The
origin of such a differential is not discussed here.
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Proposition 2 (Negative stereotyping). Under Assumption 1, the following state-
ments hold:
A. Return to search: rUW > rUB.
B. Employment disparities:
(i) 1 > p
W
> p
B
> 0;
(ii) the job-finding rate differential is ∆j f r = λ
[
G0B(pB)− G0W(pW)
]
and may be
positive or negative;
(iii) the job-loss rate differential is ∆jlr = 12
[
σ2p(pB)g˜
′
B(pB)− σ2p(pW)g˜′W(pW)
]
and may be positive or negative.
C. Wage disparities:
(i) for all p ∈ [p
W
, 1], the wage differential is ∆ω(p) = (1− β)r(UW −UB) > 0;
(ii) the quantile differential is such that z(0) > z(1) > 0.
Part A shows that whites enjoy a larger return to search. Matches with whites
are more productive on average. Therefore wage and employment expectations are
better for these workers.
Part B describes the ambiguous impacts of NS on employment outcomes. (i)
shows that whites are more selected than blacks into employment. That UW > UB
implies the match surplus conditional on belief p is always larger for blacks than for
whites. Therefore the lowest belief compatible with nonnegative surplus is larger
for whites. (ii) shows that the job-finding rate differential has ambiguous sign.
Whites have a better prior distribution, which improves their job-finding rate, but
are also more selected, which reduces their chance of finding a job. (iii) shows the
job loss rate differential also has an ambiguous sign. The flow of employees who
cross the belief threshold p
i
depends on the variance of the learning process σ2p and
on the slope of the pdf of the belief distribution evaluated at the belief threshold.
Both components differ across groups.
Part C features the non-ambiguous impacts of NS on wage outcomes. (i) shows
that blacks are discriminated against: the wage differential reveals the outside op-
tion differential benefiting to whites. (ii) shows that the associated quantile differ-
entials are positive. Whites have a better belief distribution and a higher return to
search. The former effect is especially strong at the bottom of the distribution but
disappears at its top where there is no uncertainty on match quality. Therefore NS
is better at explaining wage disparities at the bottom of the wage distribution than
at the top.
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To summarize, ex-ante differences in prior distributions have ambiguous im-
pacts on employment outcomes and nonambiguous effects on wage outcomes. In
particular, they predict positive but decreasing quantile differentials. This property
is at odds with the evidence reported in Section 2.
Screening discrimination.—We now suppose the precision of output signals dur-
ing employment differs between blacks and whites. This hypothesis is associated to
Aigner and Cain (1977) and Cornell and Welch (1996) in the context of static mod-
els. Closer to us, Ritter and Taylor (2011) provide a model of SD with employer
learning.
Assumption 2 (output observability). The standard deviation of output is larger for
blacks than for whites, i.e., σXB > σXW . Moreover, G0B = G
0
W = G
0 and bB = bW = b.
Employers have more difficulties to infer match quality from output signals
when the worker is black. Therefore learning is faster with whites, which exposes
blacks to hiring discrimination and lower wage growth.
Proposition 3 (Screening discrimination). Under Assumption 2, the following state-
ments hold:
A. Return to search: UW > UB.
B. Employment disparities:
(i) 1 > p
B
> p
W
> 0;
(ii) the job-finding rate differential is ∆j f r = λ
[
G0(p
B
)− G0(p
W
)
]
> 0;
(iii) the job-loss rate differential is ∆jlr = 12
[
σ2pB(pB)g˜
′
B(pB)− σ2pW(pW)g˜′W(pW)
]
and may be positive or negative.
C. Wage disparities:
(i) for all p ∈ [p
W
, 1], the wage differential ∆ω(p) = (1− β)r(UW −UB) > 0;
(ii) the quantile differential is such that z(1) > max{z(0), 0}.
Part A shows that, like NS, blacks have a lower return to search. Learning has
less value when the worker is black and the match surplus is smaller at given belief
on match quality.
Part B (i) shows that, unlike NS, blacks are more selected than whites into
employment. Job tenure provides less information on match quality when the job
is occupied by a black worker. Thus employers have less incentive to hire blacks.
This result implies (ii): blacks are less likely to form matches and their job-finding
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rate is smaller. (iii) shows a more intriguing result: whites may lose their jobs faster
than blacks. Output signals convey more accurate information when the worker
is white. Bad output signals, therefore, more often lead to match dissolution with
such workers. Formally, the variance of the learning process σ2p is larger for whites,
i.e., σ2pB(p) < σ
2
pW(p). Note, however, that the job loss rate differential still has
ambiguous sign because it depends on the respective numbers of blacks and whites
at risk of being dismissed. These numbers are defined by the slopes of the pdf of
the ergodic belief distributions evaluated at belief thresholds.
Part C underlines the effect of differential selection in employment on wage dis-
parities. (i) shows that blacks receive lower wages conditional on belief on match
quality. At given match quality, blacks pay the price of lower output observability.
However, they are more selected than whites, which implies that the belief distri-
bution may be better for blacks than for whites at its bottom. This is why (ii) shows
that, unlike NS, the quantile differential tends to increase with quantile.
To summarize, SD can explain why discriminated workers stay longer in unem-
ployment and receive lower wage conditional on type and belief on match quality.
It also predicts the quantile differential should be increasing in quantile. However,
SD also implies blacks tend to enjoy longer employment episodes, which is at odds
with the empirical evidence reported in Section 2. We now illustrate this important
claim through an example.
Suppose σXB is arbitrarily large and σXW = 0 so that job tenure does not provide
information for blacks, whereas match quality is revealed right after hiring for
whites. When σXB is arbitrarily large, the standard deviation is σpB(p) = 0 for
all p ∈ [0, 1]. It follows that the belief on match quality does not change with
tenure. Consequently, the wage does not change with tenure and job separation
only occurs for exogenous reasons. When σXW = 0, the belief immediately jumps
after hiring to p = 1 if µ = µH or p = 0 if µ = µL. In the former case, the
worker keeps the job until exogenous separation occurs. In the latter case, the
worker immediately quits the job and searches for another one. As information
acquisition is instantaneous, all white applicants are hired. Thus p
W
= 0 < p
B
.
The job-finding rate differential is ∆j f r = λG0(pB) > 0, whereas the job loss rate
differential is ∆jlr = λ
∫ 1
0 (1− p)dG0(p) > 0. Therefore jobs occupied by blacks last
longer.
Unemployment valuation heterogeneity.—We finally assume the utility flow de-
rived from unemployment differs between blacks and whites.
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Assumption 3 (Unemployment valuation): The utility flow derived from unemploy-
ment is larger for blacks than for whites, i.e., bB > bW . Moreover, G0B = G
0
W = G
0 and
σXB = σXW = σX.
As usual in the literature, a larger b can be associated with a higher prefer-
ence for leisure, either because blacks are less willing to work, have a larger home
production, or have a better access to the informal sector. A larger b can also be
due to lower unemployment stigma, something understandable in a community of
workers over-exposed to unemployment.
Proposition 4 (Unemployment valuation). Under Assumption 3, the following state-
ments hold:
A. Return to search: UB > UW .
B. Employment disparities:
(i) 1 > p
B
> p
W
> 0;
(ii) the job-finding rate differential is ∆j f r = λ
[
G0(p
B
)− G0(p
W
)
]
> 0;
(iii) the job-loss rate differential is ∆jlr = 12
[
σ2p(pB)g˜
′
B(pB)− σ2p(pW)g˜′W(pW)
]
and may be positive or negative.
C. Wage disparities:
(i) for all p ∈ [p
B
, 1], the wage differential is ∆ω(p) = (1− β)r(UW −UB) < 0;
(ii) the quantile differential is such that z(0) < z(1) < 1.
Part A shows that blacks have a larger return to search. Search frictions imply
that all people spend time in unemployment. Those who benefit from larger utility
flows in this state fare better.
Part B describes the implications of Assumption 3 for employment differentials.
(i) shows that blacks are more selected than whites. Matching with blacks gener-
ates lower match surplus. This implies (ii): blacks are less likely to form matches
and their job-finding rate is smaller. Less can be said for the job separation rate
differential because, here again, it depends on the derivative of the pdf of the belief
distribution at belief threshold g˜′i(pi).
Part C (i) shows that blacks bargain higher wages conditional on match quality.
This effect combined with the fact that blacks are more selected implies (ii): the
quantile differential tends to be negative and increasing in quantile. Selection does
not play any role at the top quantiles where all matches are good. Therefore the
wage quantile differential tends to increase with quantile.
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To summarize, higher UV for blacks can explain differences in employment
outcomes. However, it also makes counterfactual predictions for wage outcomes,
implying that blacks are paid more at given belief on match quality as well as
on average. From an empirical perspective, UV heterogeneity is useful because it
implies that the wage quantile differential increases with quantile.
4 Structural estimation
In this section, we present the estimation methodology, turn to estimation re-
sults and discuss the implications of our estimates for the black-white differential
return to tenure.
4.1 Econometric methodology
Indirect inference.—Following Gourieroux et al. (1993), we estimate the model by
indirect inference. It consists of a simulated method of moments (SMM) estimator,
in which some of the moments are estimated from reduced-form auxiliary models.
Let θ denote the vector of structural parameters, mS(θ) be the model-generated
vector of parameters of the auxiliary models and mD the corresponding empirical
vector. The estimation procedure finds θ such that the distance between the model-
generated moments and their empirical counterparts is as small as possible.
Specifically, the set of estimated parameters minimizes the following function:
L(θ) =
(
mD −mS(θ)
)T
W
(
mD −mS(θ)
)
, (20)
where W is a weighting matrix. Assuming LN(θ) is differentiable and attains its
global minimum at the true parameter vector θ0, a minimum verifies the following
first-order condition:
∂L(θ)
∂θ
(θ0) = −2∂m
ST(θ)
∂θ
(θ0)W
(
mD −mS(θ0)
)
= 0.
Furthermore, assuming each moment in mD is asymptotically normally dis-
tributed yields the following asymptotic distribution for θˆ:4
√
N(θˆ− θ0) ∼ N
(
0,
(
MTWM
)−1
MTWSWM
(
MTWM
)−1)
4By the mean value theorem for some θ between θˆ and θ0, we have mD −mS(θˆ) = mD −
mS(θ0) +
∂mS(θ)
∂θ′ (θ) × (θˆ − θ0), which is substituted into the first-order condition to obtain this
result.
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where N is the sample size, M the Jacobian matrix of the moment conditions with
respect to the parameters, M = ∂m
S(θ)
∂θT
(θˆ), and S the variance-covariance matrix
of the empirical moments, S = V
(√
N(mD −mS(θ0))
)
.
We approximate M using two-sided finite differences, S is obtained by boot-
strapping sample moments with 500 replications, and W is the estimated covari-
ance matrix of the moments, W = S.
Parametric assumptions.—We cannot identify all parameters. Therefore we fix
some of them to standard values. The monthly discount rate r is set to 0.0043,
which is equivalent to 5% per annum. Workers’ bargaining power β is arbitrar-
ily set to 1/2. When parameters µH, µL, bW and bB are increased by a constant
term, wages increase by the same constant and labor market transitions remain
unchanged. Therefore they cannot be separately identified and we need to fix at
least one of them. We choose µL = −µH and leave bW and bB free. In practice, the
productivity parameter differential µH − µL must be sufficiently large so that the
model can replicate the support of the empirical (efficient) wage distribution.
We also make parametric assumptions on the prior belief distributions. We sup-
pose G0B and G
0
W have truncated log-normal distributions on the support [0, pmax]
with pmax < 1. For all p ∈ [0, pmax] and i = B, W,
G0i (p) =
1
pηi
√
2pi
exp[−(ln p− γi)2/(2η2i )]
Φ[(ln pmax − γi)/ηi] , (21)
where γi and ηi are, respectively, the location and scale parameters of the distri-
bution, and φ and Φ are, respectively, the pdf and the cdf of the standard normal
distribution. The choice of log-normal functional forms is motivated by the fact that
the distributions of entry wages are actually close to log-normal. The restriction
pmax < 1 guarantees that the assumption made right before Proposition 1 holds.
Namely, we have limp→1 g0i (p)(1− p)1/2−(1/4+2δ/s
2
i )
1/2
/[A(1− p)a] < 1, which en-
sures that the top quantiles of the unconditional wage distribution are larger than
the corresponding quantiles of the entry wage distribution. In practice, we set
pmax = 0.9 and check that the mass of the log-normal distribution above pmax is
negligible.
We are left with the following vector of ten parameters to estimate θ = {γW , ηW ,γB,
ηB, σXW , σXB, bW , bB,λ, δ}. The first four relate to the distributions of prior beliefs
about match quality, σXW and σXB determine the group-specific standard devia-
tions of output, bW and bB are the utility flows derived from unemployment, λ is
the job offer rate common to both groups, and δ is the exogenous component of job
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separation.
Choice of moments and identification.—Here we discuss the different moments we
use and how they contribute to the identification of the different parameters. The
model is highly nonlinear so the discussion stays heuristic.
We emphasize employment and wage differentials between blacks and whites.
Therefore we give as much weight to blacks as a group as to whites in the esti-
mation procedure. We target 12 average labor market outcomes achieved by white
workers and consider the 12 associated ethnic differentials. The 12 moments are
described in Section 2 and follow the theoretical discussions in Section 3.2. As
for wage outcomes, we consider five quantiles of the entry wage distribution and
five quantiles of the overall wage distribution. As for employment outcomes, we
consider the job-finding and job loss rates.
The quantiles and quantile differentials of the entry wage distributions are key
to identify the parameters of the prior distributions G0B and G
0
W . The quantiles of
the unconditional wage distribution for whites are crucial to identify the standard
deviation of output σXW : the difference between the entry wage distribution and
the overall distribution depends on the speed of the learning process, which is
inversely related to this variance. Quantile differentials give a first piece of infor-
mation with regard to the respective magnitudes of NS, SD and UV heterogeneity.
Proposition 2 shows NS implies quantile differentials tend to decrease with quan-
tiles, whereas Propositions 3 and 4 suggest the opposite pattern when there is SD
or UV heterogeneity.
The job-finding rate and job-finding rate differentials allow us to identify the job
offer rate λ and the difference in probability of forming a match G0B(pB)−G0B(pW).
Once combined with the information derived from quantiles of entry wage distri-
butions, this probability difference helps us to identify the threshold beliefs p
B
and
p
W
. Lastly the job separation rate and the job separation rate differential allow us
to disentangle the exogenous and endogenous components of job loss. This pro-
cedure easily provides a value to the exogenous separation rate δ. The difference
in normalized flows of employees who cross the threshold beliefs is σ2p(pB)g˜
′
B(pB)
−σ2p(pW)g˜′W(pW). The derivative of the pdf of the belief distribution g˜′i(pi) de-
pends, among other things, on the derivative of the pdf of the prior distribution
evaluated in the belief threshold. The variance σ2p(pi) = pi(1− pi)
µH−µL
σXi
is inversely
related to the standard deviation of output σXi. Therefore we have additional in-
formation to identify the parameters of the prior distribution and the standard
deviation of output.
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The estimation is not a trivial one. Blacks and whites can differ in three ways,
but the estimation forces many parameters to be the same across groups: the ex-
ogenous separation rate δ, the job offer rate λ, discount rate r, bargaining power
β, output levels in a good match µH and in a bad one µL. Moreover, there are
trade-offs between the different moments. In particular, fitting quantiles of the un-
conditional wage distribution, quantiles of the entry wage distribution and job sep-
aration is challenging. The learning process determines wage growth over tenure
but also affects the stationary flow of employees who lose their job through the
term σ2p. Similarly, the prior belief distribution shapes the entry wage distribution
but also impacts the latter flow through the term g˜′i(pi).
4.2 Estimation results
Fit of the moments.—Table 2 compares the model outcomes with the empirical
moments chosen for estimation. We run five specifications. The first three columns
display the results when a single mechanism is at play, i.e., NS in column (1), SD
in column (2) and differences in UV in column (3). Column (4) allows for both
types of statistical discrimination (NS-SD). Finally, column (5) combines the three
mechanisms (NS-SD-UV). Columns (6) and (7) contain the means and standard
deviations of the bootstrapped moments that our estimation procedure matches.
The goodness of fit of each specification is summarized by the maximized value of
the criterion displayed by equation (20).
Table 2 shows two important results. On the one hand, models based on statis-
tical discrimination alone (NS and SD) face a fundamental trade-off between fitting
the quantile differentials of wage distributions and fitting the job loss differential.
On the other hand, combining statistical discrimination with UV allows us to es-
cape this trade-off.
All models fit reasonably well the different quantiles of the white wage distribu-
tions, the white job-finding probability and the white job loss probability. However,
all models except the NS-SD-UV fail to reproduce the large positive and increasing
quantile differentials of the unconditional wage distributions and the large job-
finding and job loss rate differentials. In columns 1 to 4, the quantile differentials
are far from the empirical ones, the job-finding rate differential is modestly pos-
itive and the job-loss rate differential is zero or negative. By contrast, the model
combining NS-SD-UV in column 5 correctly fits the quantile and transition rate dif-
ferentials. It slightly overestimates the job-finding rate differential (11.4 percentage
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Table 2: Fit of the moments
Model Data
NS SD UV NS-SD NS-SD-UV Mean St.-dev.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. Whites
Transitions
JFP .294 .294 .288 .307 .330 .331 (.003)
JLP .024 .025 .024 .025 .025 .025 (.000)
Wages
All Jobs Min .188 .185 .187 .187 .189 .181 (.002)
25th perc. .321 .318 .320 .325 .330 .323 (.003)
50th perc. .416 .411 .414 .420 .428 .415 (.004)
75th perc. .538 .533 .537 .542 .553 .536 (.004)
95th perc. .753 .748 .752 .755 .765 .761 (.005)
New Jobs Min .188 .185 .187 .187 .189 .181 (.002)
25th perc. .274 .265 .273 .267 .289 .296 (.004)
50th perc. .365 .353 .364 .354 .386 .377 (.005)
75th perc. .486 .472 .486 .471 .510 .492 (.006)
95th perc. .703 .688 .703 .682 .724 .727 (.010)
B. Racial Gaps
Transitions
JFP .012 .014 -.004 .056 .114 .102 (.008)
JLP .000 -.002 .000 -.003 .007 .011 (.001)
Wages
All Jobs Min .027 -.015 .010 .010 .016 .019 (.003)
25th perc. .025 .004 .009 .037 .041 .037 (.003)
50th perc. .022 .012 .009 .042 .058 .054 (.004)
75th perc. .016 .018 .008 .037 .078 .064 (.005)
95th perc. .003 .022 .007 .012 .102 .060 (.010)
New Jobs Min .027 -.015 .010 .010 .016 .012 (.004)
25th perc. .026 -.011 .009 .013 .061 .035 (.005)
50th perc. .023 -.008 .008 .010 .095 .049 (.007)
75th perc. .017 -.006 .007 -.002 .127 .064 (.014)
95th perc. .003 -.004 .007 -.035 .170 .051 (.025)
Criterion 567.6 597.9 628.0 464.5 147.6
Notes.—Model fit of the five specifications: Negative Stereotyping (NS) in column (1), Screening Discrimination (SD) in column
(2), differences in Unemployment Valuation (UV) in column (3), both types of statistical discrimination (NS-SD) in column (4)
and the three mechanisms (NS-SD-UV) in column (5). Columns (6) and (7) contain the means and standard deviations of the
bootstrapped moments with 500 replications. Transition rates are at monthly frequency, wages are hourly. Panel A. corresponds
to the levels of wages of white workers. Panel B. reports the racial gaps. Wages in all jobs refer to the unconditional efficient
wage distribution, wages in new jobs to the entry wage distribution.
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Table 3: Parameter Estimates
NS SD UV NS-SD NS-SD-UV
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
p0W 0.566 0.556 0.566 0.557 0.586
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.003)
p0B 0.556 0.556 0.566 0.538 0.516
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.003)
σp0W 0.083 0.083 0.084 0.081 0.081
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
σp0B 0.089 0.083 0.084 0.095 0.070
(.002) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.002)
σXW 234.48 217.00 238.22 193.63 239.54
(6.45) (5.65) (6.68) (4.53) (8.18)
σXB 234.48 324.17 238.22 398.83 165.84
(6.45) (19.13) (6.68) (28.78) (7.35)
bW -2.025 -1.910 -1.984 -1.951 -2.488
(.041) (.039) (.040) (.040) (.051)
bB -2.025 -1.910 -2.055 -1.951 -0.594
(.041) (.039) (.044) (.040) (.040)
λ 0.522 0.556 0.510 0.569 0.528
(.016) (.021) (.016) (.020) (.012)
δ 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.022
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Notes.—Estimation by SMM of the five specifications: Negative Stereotyping (NS) in col-
umn (1), Screening Siscrimination (SD) in column (2), differences in Unemployment Val-
uation (UV) in column (3), both types of statistical discrimination (NS-SD) in column (4)
and the three mechanisms (NS-SD-UV) in column (5). Bootstrapped standard errors in
parentheses. p0 i and σp0 i correspond to the mean and standard deviation of the group-i
specific prior distribution, respectively.
points against 10.2 percentage points in the data) and accounts for 65% of the job
loss rate differential.
We now describe parameter estimates before explaining these results in detail.
Parameter Estimates.—Tables 3 and 4 show the parameter estimates and some
of the endogenous variables. For expositional purposes, we report the mean and
standard deviation of the prior distribution, as opposed to the location and scale
parameters.5
In columns 1, 2 and 4, only statistical discrimination is taken into account. The
estimated parameters feature the expected situation where blacks endure both NS
5The mean p0i and standard deviation σp0i of the log-normal distribution with location and
scale parameters γi and ηi are p0i = exp(γi + η
2
i /2) and σp0i =
√
exp(2γi + η2i )(exp(η
2
i )− 1). In
our case, the priors have truncated log-normal distribution, however the latter formulas are good
proxies due to the fact that the probability mass above the truncation point pmax is negligible in all
of our estimations.
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Table 4: Endogenous variables
NS SD UV NS-SD NS-SD-UV
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
p
W
0.526 0.524 0.526 0.523 0.526
p
B
0.520 0.531 0.524 0.528 0.518
g′(p
W
) 301.13 297.91 304.77 266.59 269.07
g′(p
B
) 297.85 454.18 299.72 535.20 349.37
σpW × 100 0.532 0.575 0.523 0.644 0.520
σpB × 100 0.532 0.384 0.524 0.312 0.753
rUW 0.248 0.250 0.246 0.261 0.246
rUB 0.221 0.243 0.236 0.213 0.256
Notes.—Endogenous variables of interest of the five specifications: Negative Stereotyp-
ing (NS) in column (1), Screening Discrimination (SD) in column (2), differences in Unem-
ployment Valuation (UV) in column (3), both types of statistical discrimination (NS-SD)
in column (4) and the three mechanisms (NS-SD-UV) in column (5).
and SD. When NS is involved as in columns 1 and 4, whites enjoy a better prior
distribution.6 When SD is involved as in columns 2 and 4, output signals are
more noisy when the worker is black. In column 3, only UV is accounted for. UV
is actually larger for whites than for blacks, which explains column 3 in Table 2
displays results opposite to Proposition 4.
We now explain the trade-off between fitting the quantile differentials and fit-
ting the job loss differential. In our data, the quantile differentials of the (efficient)
wage distributions are large and increasing in quantile, whereas the job loss rate
differential is substantial. Proposition 2 shows that NS predicts decreasing quantile
differentials. Moreover, though generating positive job loss differential is theoret-
ically possible, the estimated differential is nil. Proposition 3 shows that SD can
predict increasing quantile differentials. However, SD also implies that whites lose
their jobs more rapidly.
In column 5, statistical discrimination is combined with UV heterogeneity. The
estimated parameter configuration corresponds to NS, anti-SD and larger UV for
blacks. Blacks still draw their initial belief on match quality from a worse distri-
bution than whites. However, they benefit from a faster learning process: now the
standard deviation of output signals is larger for whites. Lastly, blacks enjoy higher
utility flows once in unemployment.
Anti-SD guarantees that blacks lose their jobs faster, whereas NS implies that
6In column 1, the standard deviation is larger for Blacks, which implies that the white distri-
bution does not stochastically dominate the black one at first order. Thus the pdf of the black
distribution is slightly higher than the pdf of the white one in the neighborhood of p = 0.9.
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the job-finding rate differential is positive and blacks are paid less than whites.
According to Propositions 2 and 3, NS and anti-SD predict decreasing quantile
differentials. Meanwhile Proposition 4 shows that larger UV for blacks implies
increasing quantile differentials, which explains why bB > bW in column 5.
Anti-SD means the true match quality is easier to observe during employment
when the worker is black. This result is at odds with standard assumptions in the
literature. In their paper quantifying racial differences in unemployment, Ritter
and Taylor (2011) argue managers face more difficulties to assess the productivity
of black workers both at interview and during employment. They refer to the
theory of language discrimination put forward by Lang (1986). According to this
theory, blacks can be seen as speaking a different language, generating transaction
costs within firms. Ritter and Taylor add that managers who had to choose between
reducing the white noise or the black one would prefer reducing the white noise
because whites are more numerous. Cavounidis and Lang (2015) argue against
this view, thereby providing a possible rationale to the result of anti-SD. They also
consider managers’ incentive to supervize the different groups of workers. When
blacks occupy unproductive jobs more often than whites, managers spend more
resources monitoring blacks.
UV heterogeneity is here beneficial to blacks. This can be interpreted in terms
of heterogenous preference for leisure, domestic production, access to the informal
sector, or unemployment stigma. A controversial implication of our estimation is
that blacks and whites have the same expected utility when unemployed. Thus
the model can rationalize large residual disparities in terms of wage and transition
rates despite the typical black worker enjoys the same utility level as the typical
white worker.
In all estimates, the utility flows bB and bW obtained in unemployment are
negative. In job search models, what matters is the utility differential between
the employment and unemployment states and not the utility level obtained in
each state. We just lose the ability to measure the unemployment utility flow in
percentage of the wage.
Belief and wage distributions.—Figure 2 depicts the initial and ergodic belief dis-
tributions in two cases: NS-SD vs NS-SD-UV. The ergodic distributions are more
dispersed than the initial distributions and feature fat right tails. In both cases,
the threshold beliefs are very close. Blacks are slightly more selected in the NS-
SD case, but slightly less selected in the NS-SD-UV case. Under NS-SD, the prior
distribution of blacks has a larger variance. This property extends to the ergodic
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Figure 2: Prior and ergodic belief distributions
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(c) Prior belief distributions, NS-SD-UV
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distribution where the pdf is slightly higher for blacks at large beliefs. Under
NS-SD-UV, both the mean and the variance of the prior distribution are larger for
whites. Therefore the initial and ergodic white distributions stochastically domi-
nate at first order the corresponding black distributions.
Figure 3 shows the corresponding entry and unconditional wage distributions.
They plot the predicted and empirical wage distributions in the cases of NS-SD and
NS-SD-UV. In both cases, the entry wage distribution is less well fitted than the un-
conditional wage distribution. The estimation procedure uses efficient weighting,
which implies that the moments with the largest variance receive the lowest weight
in the loss function. Quantiles of the entry wage distribution are less precisely es-
timated because fewer workers are concerned.
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Figure 3: Fit to wage moments
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Notes.— Wages in all jobs refer to the unconditional efficient wage distribution and wages in new jobs to the entry wage
distribution.
4.3 Returns to tenure
We conclude this section by discussing the returns to tenure for blacks and
whites. Fryer Jr et al. (2013) use a dataset from the Princeton University Sur-
vey Research Center and estimate that the return to tenure is larger for blacks
by 1.1 percentage points. They rationalize this result through a stylized three-
period model of statistical discrimination. NS implies blacks are more selected
than whites. Therefore the scope for wage improvement is larger for blacks than
for whites and the wage gap decreases with tenure.
We simulate individual labor market histories for the different specifications of
our model. We discretize time at monthly frequency and compute 500-month long
histories for 25,000 individuals of each group. The details of the algorithm are
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Table 5: Black and white estimated returns to tenure on simulated data
NS SD UV NS-SD NS-SD-UV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Black -.063 .011 -.026 -.044 -.204
Tenure .017 .019 .016 .021 .016
Tenure × Black .001 -.007 .001 -.010 .019
Constant -.954 -.974 -.956 -.966 -.918
R2 .032 .026 .026 .035 .097
Notes.— Results of the OLS estimation of equation (22) using pooled data from the sim-
ulated individual histories as implied by the estimates of the five specifications: Negative
Stereotyping (NS) in column (1), Screening Discrimination (SD) in column (2), differences
in Unemployment Valuation (UV) in column (3), both types of statistical discrimination
(NS-SD) in column (4) and the three mechanisms (NS-SD-UV) in column (5). Tenure is in
years. Simulated data for each specification are obtained by generating 500-month long
history for 25,000 individuals of each group. Total number of observations ≈ 23,000,000
depending on specification.
provided in Appendix E. We then perform the following OLS regression:
ln wiτ = a0 + a1Blacki + a2τ + a3Blacki × τ + εi. (22)
Table 5 reports the estimates. Each column corresponds to a particular specifi-
cation of the model. Statistical discrimination alone does not predict the narrowing
of racial differences in wages with tenure, as reported by Fryer et al. Column 1
corresponds to the case advocated by Fryer et al. NS effectively implies that the
return to tenure is larger for blacks. However, the estimated belief thresholds are
very close to each other so that selection effects are quantitatively small. In column
4 NS is combined with SD. SD dominates selection effects induced by NS and the
predicted return to tenure is larger for whites by 1 percentage point. By contrast,
the combination of NS, SD and UV implies that the return to tenure is larger for
blacks by 1.9 percentage points. The small R2 in all regressions reflect that ran-
dom draws on match quality account for a very large part of wages at all tenures.
Moreover the wage predicted by our model is not log-linear in tenure; a log-linear
regression therefore leads to systematic errors that reduce the R2. Adding tenure
squared and its interaction with the racial dummy increases the R2 by 5 percentage
points on average.
The estimates performed from the NS-SD-UV sample have the same order of
magnitude as Fryer et al. However, the economic mechanism strongly differs from
theirs. They emphasize selection effects induced by NS. Here selection effects can
be neglected and the differential return to tenure is entirely due to anti-SD.
Figure 4a depicts the predicted log median wage differential by tenure for the
NS-SD and NS-SD-UV specifications. The horizontal line is the minimum log wage
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Figure 4: Differential return to tenure and experience according to model specifi-
cation
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(b) Differential return to experience
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Notes.— Median log wage gap is defined as the black-white difference in median log wage by tenure. It is calculated from
the simulated data obtained by generating 500-month long history for 25,000 individuals of each group. The dashed lines
measure the wage gap that results from differences in workers’ outside options.
differential between the two groups reflecting the differential return to search. In
the NS-SD case, the median wage differential strictly increases with tenure, starting
relatively low around 2.5% and reaching over 15% after 15 years. In the NS-SD-
UV specification, the median wage differential strictly decreases, starting relatively
large around 25% and almost reaching 0 after 15 years. The slope of each curve
decreases with tenure in absolute value. This confirms that the differential return
to tenure decreases with tenure.
The differential return to tenure does not coincide with the differential return
to experience because blacks and whites have different job durations. Figure 4b
shows the log median wage differential by experience for the NS-SD and NS-SD-
UV estimates. The NS-SD curve is below the NS-SD-UV curve partly reflecting the
poor ability of the NS-SD case to fit the large quantile differentials of the uncondi-
tional wage distributions. In the NS-SD estimate, the job loss rate is slightly larger
for whites, so that the differential return to experience is increasing but at a smaller
pace than the differential return to tenure. In the NS-SD-UV specification, jobs last
longer for whites, so that the differential return to experience is larger than the dif-
ferential return to tenure. Overall, the predicted differential return to experience is
slightly decreasing at low experience and roughly constant over 15 years.
4.4 Robustness
In this section, we discuss the robustness of our results.
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Efficient vs equal weighting.—We use efficient weighting, which means that less
precisely estimated moments receive less weight than accurately estimated ones.
Since the sample contains fewer blacks than whites, quantile differentials and tran-
sition rate differentials have less weight than quantiles and transition rates for
whites. Moreover, the quantiles and quantile differentials of the entry wage dis-
tribution are also less weigthed than the quantile and quantile differentials of the
unconditional distribution. In an unreported estimation, we consider equal weight-
ing matrix. Though the results differ quantitatively, the main message remains.
Statistical discrimination alone cannot simultaneously fit the large increasing dif-
ferential quantiles of the unconditional wage distributions and the large transition
rate differentials. The preferred estimation still involves NS, anti-SD and larger UV
for blacks.
Prejudiced employers vs statistical discrimination.—We do not try to disentangle
racial prejudice from unobserved heterogeneity. Negative stereotyping, therefore,
combines lower skills for blacks and distaste for employing these workers. Our
contribution is to quantify the contributions of such negative stereotyping and dif-
ferential learning to employment and wage disparities. Identification of differential
learning exploits the job loss differential and differences between entry wage and
unconditional wage distributions. In this perspective, our paper is complementary
to the literature devoted to the structural estimation of equilibrium search mod-
els of taste-based discrimination, already presented in the Introduction. It would
be interesting to develop and estimate a model featuring both types of discrimi-
nation. However, accounting for taste-based discrimination should not affect the
result whereby anti-SD is necessary to fit the large job loss rate differential.
Human capital accumulation.—Our model neglects human capital accumulation
as a potential factor of wage growth. Efficient wages partly account for experience
because the log hourly wage of newly hired whites is regressed on age and age
squared. However, this procedure implies that workers accumulate human capital
during nonemployment episodes. Since blacks spend less time in employment, the
computation magnifies the contribution of experience to black wages. Therefore
efficient wages tend to overestimate wage gaps and the magnitude of this bias
increases with age. Quantile differentials are likely to be smaller and increase
less with quantiles than the ones we try to fit. Accounting for such a bias may
improve the relevance of SD as a potential explanation of residual wage disparities.
Estimating the effects of experience in structural search models is a non-trivial
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task (see Bagger et al. (2014)). The problem is a difficult one in our case where
learning offers a competitive explanation for wage growth within firms. Therefore
we mention it as a limit of our work and call for additional research.
On-the job search.—Job-shopping provides another engine of wage growth that
we neglect. Workers may find a better job and obtain a pay rise by changing firms.
Nothing prevents us from introducing on-the-job search in our model. However,
it is unlikely to affect our main result that learning is faster with black workers.
Moscarini (2005) extends his model to on-the-job search. Workers who contact an
alternative employer benefit from a new start with fixed prior belief p0. In our
model, such workers would draw a new belief according to their group-specific
prior distribution. As NS implies that whites draw better beliefs than blacks, the
consideration of on-the-job search would naturally lead to the conclusion that white
wages grow faster. The estimation would even be more in favor of anti-SD because
on-the-job search alone would help to fit wage disparities. Of course, this argument
is subject to the actual way to account for on-the-job search in the estimation. Here
again, we call for additional research on the topic.
5 Conclusion
In the US, black workers spend more time in unemployment, lose their jobs
more rapidly, and earn lower wages than white workers. This paper quantifies the
contributions of statistical discrimination, as portrayed by negative stereotyping
and screening discrimination, to such employment and wage disparities. We de-
velop an equilibrium search model of statistical discrimination with learning based
on Moscarini (2005) and estimate it by indirect inference. We show that statisti-
cal discrimination alone cannot simultaneously explain the observed differences in
residual wages and monthly job loss probabilities between black and white work-
ers. However, a model with negative stereotyping, larger unemployment valuation
and faster learning about the quality of matches for black workers can account
for these facts. One implication of our findings is that black workers have larger
returns to tenure.
There are several avenues for research. First, the model and estimation method-
ologies can be applied to alternative datasets and groups of workers. Second, it
would be worth providing microfoundations to exogenous key parameters like the
ethnic-specific degree of observability of true match quality (see, e.g., Cavounidis
and Lang (2015) who argue that managers have more incentive to monitor blacks
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because these workers historically had lower skills). A third set of extensions would
enrich the current model. For instance, we could introduce on-the-job search and
human capital investment to improve our knowledge of returns to tenure and ex-
perience for blacks and whites.
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A Measuring the ins and outs of unemployment
To measure the monthly probability that an employed worker becomes unem-
ployed, JLPt, and the monthly probability that an unemployed worker finds a job,
JFPt, we follow Shimer (2012). Let ut denote the number of unemployed work-
ers at the end of month t and ust the number of workers who at time t have been
unemployed for less than a month; then JFPt can be backed out from the data
using:
ut+1 = (1− JFPt)ut + ust+1, (23)
which implies
JFPt = 1−
ut+1 − ust+1
ut
. (24)
To compute the job loss probabilities, we account for time aggregation bias and
solve the following equation in jlrt:
ut+1 =
j f rt
j f rt + jlrt
(1− e−j f rt−jlrt)lt + e−j f rt−jlrt ut, (25)
where lt is the labor force and j f rt = − ln(1− JFPt). Then, jlrt = − ln(1− JLPt).
B Endogenous contact rate
In the model the value of a vacancy is arbitrarily set to 0, whereas the contact
rate λ is exogenous. As in Papageorgiou (2014), this assumption is innocuous.
Suppose there is a constant-return to scale Cobb-Douglas matching function that
sets the number of meets. Then the contact rate is λ(x) = Axa, 0 < a < 1, where
x is the vacancy-to-unemployed ratio. Moreover, suppose that holding a vacancy
involves paying the flow cost κ. The value of a vacancy V solves
rV = −κ + λ(x)
x ∑i
mi
∫ ∫ 1
p
i
[Jiα(p)−V]dG0i (p)dΨi(α). (26)
Assuming free entry of new firms leads to V = 0 and so
κ =
λ(x)
x ∑i
mi
∫ ∫ 1
p
i
αJi(p)dG0i (p)dΨi(α). (27)
Thus for a given set of parameter estimates and a given θ, we compute the right-
hand side of equation (27) with λ(x) = λ, set A = λx−a and κ as the left-hand side
of equation (27).
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C The solution of the HJB equation
The solution is a slight amendment to Moscarini (2005). We first check that the
proposed function solves equation (12) and then show that the optimal stopping
belief is well-defined and belongs to the interval (0, 1). Hereafter we neglect type
α and demographic group i. Let n =
√
1/4+ 2(r + δ)/s2, s ≡ (µH − µL)/σX. We
obtain
S′(p) = cp−1/2−n(1− p)−1/2+n(1/2− n− p) + µH − µL
r + δ
,
S′′(p) = −c(1/4− n2)p−3/2−n(1− p)−3/2+n.
Plugging S′(p) and S′′(p) into (12) shows that (13) defines the solution.
Moreover, c and p solve the following system of equations:
S′(p) = cp−1/2−n(1− p)−1/2+n(1/2− n− p) + µH − µL
r + δ
= 0, (28)
S(p) = cp
1
2−n(1− p) 12+n + µ(p)− rU
r + δ
= 0, (29)
The value of unemployment and the optimal stopping belief solve rU = rU1(p) =
rU2(p), where
rU1(x) = µL + x(µH − µL) + (µH − µL) x(1− x)n + x− 1/2, (30)
rU2(x) =
b + βλ
∫
p≥x
[
c(x)p1/2−n(1− p)1/2+n + µ¯(p)r+δ
]
dG0(p)
1+ βλ[1− G0(x)]/(r + δ) , (31)
c(x) =
µH − µL
n + x− 1/2 x
1/2+n(1− x)1/2−n/(r + δ). (32)
Let φ(x) = rU1(x)− rU2(x). We have
φ(0) =
(µL − b)(r + δ)− βλ(µH − µL)
∫ 1
0 pdG
0(p)
r + δ+ βλ
< 0,
φ(1) = µH − b > 0,
by assumption (11). Therefore there is p ∈ (0, 1) such that φ(p) = 0. Moreover,
rU′1(x) =
(µH − µL)(n2 − 1/4)
(n + x− 1/2)2 ,
{1+ βλ[1− G0(x)]/(r + δ)}rU′2(x) = −βλ
[
c(x)x1/2−n(1− x)1/2+n + µ¯(x)
r + δ
− rU2(x)
r + δ
]
g0(x)
+βλ
∫
x
c′(x)p1/2−n(1− p)1/2+ndG0(p),
c′(x) = (µH − µL)(n
2 − 1/4)
(n + x− 1/2)2 x
−1/2+n(1− x)−1/2−n/(r + δ).
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In x = p, we have
φ′(p) = (µH − µL)(n
2 − 1/4)
(n + p− 1/2)2 −
βλ
1+ βλ[1− G0(p)]/(r + δ)
∫
p
c′(p)p1/2−n(1− p)1/2+ndG0(p)
>
(µH − µL)(n2 − 1/4)
(n + p− 1/2)2
[
1−
∫
p≥p
(p/p)1/2−n((1− p)/(1− p))1/2+ndG0(p)
]
> 0
because the term p1/2−n(1 − p)1/2+n decreases with p on the interval [0, 1]. It
follows that p is uniquely defined by the requirement φ(p) = 0.
D Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Ergodic belief distribution
We neglect the index i. Let y(p) = p2(1− p)2g(p). We have
y′′(p) + f (p)− (ν2 − 1/4) y(p)p2(1−p)2 = 0,∫ 1
p g(p)dp = m− u ∈ [0, m],
y(p) = 0.
(∗)
The general solution to problem (∗) has the form:
νy(p) = [p(1− p)]1/2−ν ×{
c2p2ν + c1(1− p)2ν + p2ν
∫ 1
p
λug0(x)x1/2−ν(1− x)1/2+ν
2
dx
−(1− p)2ν
∫ 1
p
λug0(x)x1/2+ν(1− x)1/2−ν
2
dx
}
, (33)
where c1 and c2 are two constant terms. According to the first boundary condition,∫ 1
p g(p)dp converges, which implies that c2 = 0. The second boundary condition
gives c1 = λuk. The unnormalized density results by dividing y(p) by p2(1 −
p)2. Three terms remain. The first term is always definite when p < 1. The
second term is finite for all p < 1 when g0i (1) is finite. As for the last term, the
integral is finite under the assumption that there exist A < ∞ and a > −1 such
that limx→1 g0i (x)(1− x)1/2−νi /[A(1− x)a] < 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. Negative stereotyping
Part A. Suppose UW ≤ UB. Using (7) and (10), the value of unemployment can
be rewritten as
rUW = b + βλ
∫ 1
0
max{SW(p), 0}g0W(p)dp. (34)
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The surplus equation (12) implies that S′′W(p) = S
′′
B(p) and thus SW(p) ≥ SB(p),
for all p ∈ [0, 1]. Using this fact
rUW ≥ b + βλ
∫ 1
0
max{SB(p), 0}g0W(p)dp. (35)
Since Si is strictly increasing in p ∈ [pi, 1], Assumption 1 also implies
b + βλ
∫ 1
0
max{SB(p), 0}g0W(p)dp > b + βλ
∫ 1
0
max{SB(p), 0}g0B(p)dp = rUB.
(36)
And so we have proved UW > UB. This contradicts the assumption that UW ≤ UB.
Thus, UW > UB.
Part B. (i) Using equations (28) and (29), we obtain
rUi = µL + (µH − µL)(n + 1/2)
p
i
n + p
i
− 1/2. (37)
The ratio is strictly increasing in p
i
. From part A, we have UW > UB, which implies
that p
W
> p
B
.
(ii) The group-i specific job-finding rate is j f ri = λ[1− G0i (pi)], i = B, W. The
result follows from part (i) and Assumption 1.
(iii). At any time, the flow number of group-i workers who lose their job is
δ(1 − ui) + 0.5σ2(pi)g′i(pi). Thus the group-i specific job-loss rate is jlri = δ +
0.5σ2(p
i
)g′i(pi)/(1− ui), i = B, W. The result follows.
Part C. (i) We have ωi(p) = βµ¯(p) + (1− β)rUi for i = B, W and p ∈ [pi, 1]. This
proves the result.
(ii) We have ωiq = β(µH − µL)G˜−1i (q) + (1 − β)rUi + βµL. Therefore z(0) =
β(µH − µL)(pW − pB) +(1− β)r(UW −UB) > z(1) = (1− β)r(UW −UB) by parts
A and B (i).
Proof of Proposition 3. Screening discrimination
Part A. Let U ≡ U(σX) denote the value of unemployment when the standard
deviation of output is σX. By construction, we have UB = U(σB) and UW = U(σW).
Using the notations of Appendix C, we have rU(σX) = rU1(p, σX) = rU2(p, σX),
where the dependence vis-a`-vis σX has been highlighted. Similarly we define
c(x, σX) ≡ c(x).
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We now show that rU′(σX) < 0. Let f (x, n) = 1n+x−1/2
[
x/(1−x)
p/(1−p)
]n
. We have
∂(rU1)
∂σX
= −(µH − µL) x(1− x)(n + x− 1/2)2
dn
dσX
< 0,
∂(rU2)
∂σX
=
βλ
∫
x
∂
∂n (c(x, n)p
1/2−n(1− p)1/2+n)dG0(p)
1+ βλr+δ [1− G0(x)]
dn
dσX
.
But ∂∂n (c(x, n)p
1/2−n(1− p)1/2+n) has the sign of fn(x, n) = ln
[
x/(1−x)
p/(1−p)
]
f (x, n)−
f (x,n)
n+x−1/2 < 0. Therefore
∂(rU1)
∂σX
< 0 and ∂(rU2)∂σX < 0 for all x ∈ (0, 1). It follows that
rU′(σX) < 0 and so U(σXW ) > U(σXB).
Part B. (i) Let φ(x, σX) = rU1(x, σX)− rU2(x, σX). We have dp/dσX = −φσX (p,σX)φx(p,σX) ,
which has the sign of −φσX(p, σX). As shown in the proof of Part A, we have
φσX(p, σX) = −
(µH − µL)p(1− p)
(n + p− 1/2)2
dn
dσX
+
βλ[1− G0(p)]
r + δ+ βλ[1− G0(p)]
dn
dσX
×
(µH − µL)p(1− p)
n + p− 1/2
∫ 1
p
[
1
n + p− 1/2 − ln
p/(1− p)
p/(1− p)
]
p(1− p)
(
p/(1− p)
p/(1− p)
)n
dG0(p)
1− G0(p)
= − (µH − µL)p(1− p)
(n + p− 1/2)2
dn
dσX
×
{
1− βλ[1− G
0(p)]
r + δ+ βλ[1− G0(p)]×∫ 1
p
[
1− (n+p− 1/2) ln p/(1−p)
p/(1− p)
](
p/(1− p)
p/(1− p)
)n
p(1− p)dG0(p)
1− G0(p)
}
< − (µH−µL)p(1−p)
(n+p−1/2)2
dn
dσX
{
1−1
2
∫ 1
p
[
1− (n + p−1/2) ln p/(1−p)
p/(1− p)
](
p/(1−p)
p/(1− p)
)n
dG0(p)
1− G0(p)
}
.
which has the sign of I = 12
∫
p
[
1− (n + p− 1/2) ln p/(1−p)p/(1−p)
] (
p/(1−p)
p/(1−p)
)n
dG0(p)
1−G0(p) −
1. Let f (y) = yn ln y. The function f is such that f (0) = f (1) = 0 and f ′(y) =
yn−1(1 + n ln y). Therefore f (y) ≥ −(ne)−1 for all y ∈ [0, 1]. It follows that I <
1
2 +
n+p−1/2
ne − 1 < 1/e− 1/2 < 0. Thus dp/dσX > 0 and pB > pW .
(ii). The group-i specific job-finding rate is j f ri = λ[1− G0(pi)], i = B, W. The
result follows from part (i).
(iii). See the proof of Part B (iii) of Proposition 2.
Part C. (i) The result follows from Part A.
(ii). We have z(0) = β(µH − µL)
[
p
W
− p
B
]
+ (1 − β)r (UW −UB) < (1 −
β)r (UW −UB) = z(1) by part B (i).
Proof of Proposition 4. Unemployment valuation heterogeneity
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Part A. Let U ≡ U(b) denote the value of unemployment when the utility
flow derived from unemployment is b. By construction, we have UB = U(bB) and
UW = U(bW). Using the notations of Appendix C, we have rU(b) = rU1(p) =
rU2(p, b), where the dependence vis-A˜ -vis b has been highlighted. We have
∂(rU2(x, b))/∂b > 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1], which implies that rU′(b) > 0. Therefore
U(bB) > U(bW).
Part B. (i) Let φ(x, b) = rU1(x)− rU2(x, b). We have dp/db = −φb(p, b)/φx(p, b),
which has the sign of −φb(p, b). But the proof of Part A shows that φb(p, b) =
−∂(rU2(p, b))/∂b < 0. Therefore dp/db > 0 and pB > pW .
(ii). The group-i specific job-finding rate is j f ri = λ[1− G0(pi)], i = B, W. The
result follows from part (i).
(iii). See the proof of part B (iii) of Proposition 2.
Part C. (i) The result follows from Part A.
(ii). We have z(0) = β(µH − µL)
[
p
W
− p
B
]
+ (1 − β)r (UW −UB) < (1 −
β)r (UW −UB) = z(1) < 0 by parts A and B (i).
E Algorithm to simulate individual histories
To simulate individual labor market histories, we discretize time at monthly
frequency and use the following steps to compute 500-month long histories for
25,000 individuals of each group.
1. All individuals start unemployed in the first period.
2. At the beginning of each period, unemployed find a job with probability
1− exp(−λ[1− G0i (pi)]); the initial prior about match quality pi0 is drawn
from the race-specific truncated distribution G0i (p|pi0 > pi). The true match
quality is determined by an additional draw where the probability of being
in a good-quality match is pi0 = Pr(µ = µH).
3. At the beginning of each period, employed workers transit to unemployment
with probability 1− exp(−δ).
4. Employed workers who are not hit by an exogenous shock in Step 3 remain
active and flow output is µ+ σXiZ1 where Z1 ∼ N (0, 1).
5. The probability that the match is good pit is updated using equation (4).
Workers in matches where pit < pi become unemployed in the following
period.
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